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Abstract—The problem of user authentication and authoriza-
tion is usually being solved in a single system. Federated
environment assumes heterogeneity of systems, which brings
the problem of mutual users and services authentication and
authorization. In this article the authors presented security
requirements for cross domain information exchange in feder-
ated environments and a method of secure access to informa-
tion resources on the basis of web services. Special attention
was paid to authentication and authorization of users and ser-
vices. As opportunities, there were presented solutions veriﬁed
in multinational experimentations and exercises.
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1. Introduction
The main tenet of net-centricity is to achieve informa-
tion superiority by sharing reliable information collected
from various sources, creating situational awareness and
distributing it among mission participants, across domains,
context and organizational boundaries. However, the im-
provement of collaboration and information sharing in
highly dynamic, unpredictable network enabled capabil-
ity (NEC) environment is a great challenge. It assumes
transfer of information between users of so called federa-
tion of systems with required quality of service and security
independently of the underlying infrastructure as well as
common access to relevant information by the authorized
users.
Federation of systems (FoS) capability derives from the
strategy for developing the networking and information
sharing aspects of NATO NEC (NNEC) and focuses on
joining together the networking and core information sys-
tems from NATO and NATO nations. The FoS concept
refers to a set of diﬀerent systems, which are not centrally
managed, but are so connected or related as to produce
results beyond those achievable by the individual systems
alone [1]. This implies that networking and information in-
frastructures (NII) consists of national NIIs segments and
a NATO networking and information infrastructure (NNII),
which together will provide capabilities that no system can
provide by itself. This concept is similar to the one known
from Internet, where there is no central control, and the syn-
ergy for the federation is achieved through collaboration
and cooperation. Operational capabilities needed to con-
duct modern military operation, from the technical point
of view, impose the use of ﬂexible, adaptable architec-
ture enabling seamless information exchange in dynami-
cally changing, unpredictable federation of systems. In or-
der to satisfy these requirements, NATO recommends the
use of service oriented architectures (SOAs), that succeeded
in commercial world lately and are seen as the crucial
NEC enabler [1], [2], [3].
Service orientation is a conceptual architecture which
asymmetrically provides services to arbitrary service con-
sumers, facilitating the information sharing in heteroge-
neous environment, and thus supports, to some degree, as-
pects of net-centricity. SOA can make military information
resources available in the form of services that can be dis-
covered and used by all mission participants that do not
need to be aware of these services in advance. That is why
the NII strategy assumes that the system infrastructure will
be implemented as a FoSs, involving the use of SOA to
expose software functions as consumable services that can
be discovered and invoked across the network.
SOA’s greatest advantage is the ability of seamless infor-
mation exchange based on diﬀerent policies and loose cou-
pling of its components. However, this can be realized by
the widespread use of open standards. One of the most ma-
ture realizations of SOA assumes application of web ser-
vices (WS) – the most successful implementation of this
paradigm.
WSs, based on extensible markup language (XML), SOAP,
web services description language (WSDL) and related
open standards, implemented in national systems, allow
data and applications to interact without human interven-
tion through dynamic, ad hoc coalition connections. WSs
are in fact described by a wide range of standards that deal
with diﬀerent aspects of WS realization, transport, orches-
tration, semantics etc. They provide means to build a very
ﬂexible environment that is able to dynamically link diﬀer-
ent system components to each other. The most important
and obvious advantage of this solution is its natural appli-
cability to FoS, where it can be implemented in a wide
variety of communications systems, can coexist with other
technologies and software design approaches [4], and be
adopted in evolutionary way without the need to modify
the legacy systems.
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2. Security Challenges
Sharing information among mission participants in FoS
imposes many technological interoperability on data, ap-
plication and communications levels. What is more, the
unpredictability of this environment, mobility and dy-
namic nature of NEC operations impose several threats
that do not occur in a system managed by single adminis-
tration.
The security challenges inherent to the web services ap-
proach are alarming and unavoidable [2]. Many of the
features that make web services attractive, including greater
accessibility of data, dynamic application-to-application
connections, and relative autonomy (lack of human inter-
vention) are being seen by the security oﬃcers as threat-
ening or even forbidden with traditional security models
and controls. Even the idea of ubiquitous information shar-
ing with diﬀerent security classiﬁcation between domains
building FoS is currently seen as risky.
Security objectives [5] for federated SOA-based systems
are the same as for all IT communication means and cover
conﬁdentiality, integrity, access control, non-repudiation,
accountability and availability. Such attitude guarantees
a controlled access to network elements, services and ap-
plications for identiﬁed users.
Both identiﬁcation of users and services across domains
and providing appropriate information for making au-
thorization decision rise interoperability problems. It is
even more visible in SOA- based systems, where services
can be invoked by users not known in design time, so
that SOA-based systems must face up additional require-
ments [6]:
– balancing information sharing with security,
– trust propagation between federated systems,
– minimizing vulnerabilities (e.g., in terms of software
development),
– providing access to system resources for unantici-
pated users.
First of all, in order for the users to share the informa-
tion and use the received ones, they must be sure that the
source and sink are reliable. Information can be, though
shared only among users/devices that have been identi-
ﬁed and are approved for this kind of data. Only cross-
domain authentication and authorization, based on trust re-
lation between security providers and appropriate identity
management are able to fulﬁll initial security requirements
for FoS.
As shown in Fig. 1, in national C4I system the access to
information is controlled and granted only for authenticated
and entitled users from this domain. Access control is an
internal issue of the system and can be realized in diﬀer-
ent ways. The authorization decision is made locally and
usually bases not only on user rights attributes but also
on invoked web service attributes and valid security pol-
icy. The set of user attributes required for making decision
may diﬀer depending on the system implementation. The
mechanism usually secures all information ﬂows inside the
system.
Fig. 1. Cross-domain authentication and authorization of
users and services. Intradomain and interdomain security mecha-
nisms.
The authentication mechanism is to conﬁrm the identity of
a user or service (see Fig. 2). To perform access con-
trol, web services need to identify and authenticate the re-
questers. In FoS it can be performed by diﬀerent means.
Each domain can have their own authentication services
that base on login/password, X.509 certiﬁcates, biometric
data, etc. Authentication services in diﬀerent domains must
interoperate with each other and accept the identity conﬁr-
mation issued in other domain (some kind of a token). It
must be emphasized that the user must be appropriately
identiﬁed across domain boundaries.
Fig. 2. Authentication, authorization and trust relation in cross-
domain information sharing.
The access to services can be granted or denied based on
the authorization service decision which can use diﬀer-
ent access control (AC) models (e.g., role based – RBAC,
attribute based – ABAC, policy based – PBAC, risk adap-
tive – RAAC). In real life scenarios domains can use dif-
ferent combinations of the above, applying rules that are
deﬁned for this particular system. These rules can be gen-
erally called policy of information sharing, which do not
imply that this is PBAC.
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In disrupted networks, where connections are not stable,
to achieve the reliability of the system, a distributed pol-
icy repository implementation is recommended. This so-
lution allows all policy decision points (PDPs) present in
the system to perform authorization decision invoking lo-
cal copy of the policy. It should be noted that the pol-
icy rules may change dynamically during the system and
mission lifetime (e.g., domains or users may become un-
trusted). The rules may change as a result of the adminis-
trator activities as well as the actual risk assessment. These
changes must be immediately distributed to all policy repos-
itories employed in the system. Eﬀective policy database
replication mechanism is essential to enable all PDPs to
realize access control decisions according to current and
valid rules.
Some users may frequently request particular set of services
provided by own or federated domains. Getting authoriza-
tion each time the user queries any resource may overload
the security services and can make the process of retriev-
ing results more cumbersome. Thus, an important issue is
the provision of a mechanism allowing users to authenti-
cate with one system to a single point (the user’s identity
provider) and, on the basis of that authentication statement
(usually being some kind of a token), use other services and
applications within SOA. This mechanism is called single
sign-on (SSO) (see Fig. 3). SSO allows users to have more
ﬂexible access to system resources which can limit the time
needed to get necessary data and number of authentication
requests.
Fig. 3. Single sign on in FoS.
As it was already stated, one of the core requirements for
sharing information on FoS is trust relation among coop-
erating nations. All entities involved in a transaction or
process must trust one another. A level of trust must be in
place for the parties willing to cooperate in common op-
erations and to exchange sensitive information in a timely
manner. The willingness to share and accept information
depends heavily on trusting the receiver and the provider
of information.
There are several trust relationship models that can be used
in WS security. The most useful is federation of trust,
which bases on the federated identity management. A feder-
ated trust model allows users and web services from various
domains to interact with some level of security. It is based
on both the brokered and bilateral trust models. Particular
domains use so called trusted third party (TTP) that is to
certify that a service or a requester can be trusted within
the domain. Each domain has its own TTP and TTPs of
these domains have mutual relationships. Establishing trust
is very important during the client-provider transactions as
well as in service-to-service interactions.
Provision of security in terms of authentication and au-
thorization in federated environment goes beyond the chal-
lenges presented above. Cross-domain solutions that pro-
vide the identiﬁcation of users, are able to present and then
to analyze their credentials for the purpose of authorization.
They usually base on assertions or tokens that prove local
authentication and enable granting access to the resource.
The problem gets more complicated when we imagine a ser-
vice composition (the chain of services), when one applica-
tion requests data from another one. In this case, the entity
that initiated the process should be granted the access to
particular resources. The problem can be solved by iden-
tity delegation that assumes passing identity of requesting
user through the service chain, however its technical real-
ization can be cumbersome in the range of one system, not
mentioning a federated environment.
3. Opportunities
In order to show the opportunities of authentication and
authorization in a federated environment, we present the
results of experiments that were carried out during prepa-
ration for the multinational experimentation MNE 6 and
demonstrated on the Combined Warrior Interoperability
Demonstration (CWID) in 2009. The solution covers the
basic requirements for authentication and authorization of
users and services and was used to share data between mar-
itime systems supporting creating multinational interagency
situational awareness on the sea. This section describes the
cross-domain authentication and authorization solution that
was implemented in two diﬀerent domains independently,
given existing local interdomain security mechanisms.
3.1. Description of the Trial
The authentication and authorization mechanisms in pre-
sented system are developed in service oriented architecture
as a set of loosely coupled security web services. To ensure
a trust relation between heterogeneous domains forming
federation of systems there was assumed mutual acknowl-
edgement of public key infrastructures (PKIs) approved in
each domain.
When the user wants to get access to a resource located out-
side his domain, he needs to be authenticated in his own
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domain. In order to prove his authentication in the other
domain he gets security assertion (some kind of a passport)
consisting of user identity, public key and attributes. Local
authentication can be made with diﬀerent security mecha-
nisms, e.g., id and password, Kerberos ticket, X.509 certiﬁ-
cate (see Fig. 4). This solution guarantees the independence
of policy rules in each autonomous system. However, the
assertion must be understandable to the cooperating system.
The trust to the users is internal case of the system and
may depend on the authentication method, because there is
a huge diﬀerence of eﬃciency between X.509 and, e.g., id
and password mechanism.
Fig. 4. X.509 certiﬁcate schema.
In the presented solution X.509 certiﬁcates [7] were im-
plemented for the intradomain user authentication. Certiﬁ-
cates based on open industry standards are supported on
many platforms. Additionally, X.509 certiﬁcates can be
used to provide conﬁdentiality and data origin authentica-
tion at the message and transport layer. The identity of
particular participant in a message exchange is unique and
can be conﬁrmed by veriﬁcation of signature made using
X.509 certiﬁcates.
For cross-domain authentication security assertion markup
language (SAML) [8] tokens were chosen. They carry
X.509 credentials and additional values, e.g., signatures
and user attributes. SAML is an XML-based standard
introduced by Security Services Technical Committee of
the OASIS for exchanging authentication and authorization
data between security domains. In the presented model,
SAML assertions are transferred from identity provider
(that can be, e.g., secure token service) to service provider.
It must be noted that signatures included in SAML to-
kens guarantee the message integrity and non-repudiation
(signatures unable to fake identity of user and his at-
tributes).
The advantage of utilizing SAML is its ﬂexibility and adapt-
ability to carrying variety of properties which can be used
for securing communication. In fact, only a few elements
are mandatory in SAML assertion and the rest is optional.
Assertion contains statements that the service provider uses
to make access control decisions.
Fig. 5. SAML assertion schema (grey tags are for obligatory
elements, white ones – for optional).
SAML provides three statements (see Fig. 5.):
• Authentication – asserts the service provider that the
principal (e.g., STS, PEP) authenticated the requester
at a particular time using a given method of authen-
tication (e.g., user/password, biometric data, X.509
certiﬁcates, Kerberos, etc);
• Attribute – provides attributes of requester that could
be used to make access control decision;
• Authorization decision statements – provide permis-
sions for particular actions.
SAML assertion is composed of obligatory and optional
elements. This allowed us to incorporate information about
local authentication of the user based on X509 certiﬁcates
and send user attributes for the purpose of authorization.
SAML assertion used for the trial consisted of the following
elements:
• Issuer – the unique identiﬁer of the requesting service
provider/the unique identiﬁer of STS, PEP;
• Subject – SOAP message source unique identiﬁer (re-
quester or a service provider).
Both the issuer and the subject data are extracted
from X.509 certiﬁcates and consist of common
name, organization unit, organization, country (CN,
OU, O, C);
• Signature – a value obtained from signing the whole
request/response message; it provides the message
integrity and guarantees non-repudiation;
• Conditions – the validity period; it consists of values:
NotBefore and NotOnOrAfter;
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Fig. 6. Core security services system workﬂow diagram.
Fig. 7. Workﬂow of processing SOAP request and response messages.
• Authentication statement – a method used for the au-
thentication of the user;
• Attribute statement – attributes of the user used for
authorization, e.g. military rank, function in organi-
zation, secrecy permissions.
3.2. Implementation of the Solution
Each request to a service must be augmented with appro-
priate SAML assertion, with a token proving the user au-
thentication and its credentials necessary for local autho-
rization. Such an assertion the user usually gets from so
called security token service, that is able to verify its iden-
tity (based on the local authentication mechanisms) and to
prepare an appropriate SAML assertion, understandable to
the requested site. Appropriately prepared SOAP message
is sent to the service.
For the purpose of the trial, a set of security services was
implemented (see Fig. 6). They are to provide cross-domain
authorization and authentication based on the trust relation.
Policy enforcement point is treated as main SAML assertion
processing module (engine). It analyzes part of the SOAP
message header, i.e., SAML assertion and delegates tasks
to particular auxiliary security modules: CertVerify ser-
vice, AuthorizationWS service and KeyNegotiate service.
Together with PEP they create the core security services
system.
PEP and auxiliary modules are implemented as web ser-
vices communicating with each other with SOAP messages.
As mentioned before, PEP with auxiliary services, is re-
sponsible for validating SAML assertions. It:
– validates X.509 certiﬁcate and digital signature of
SOAP message embedded in assertion,
– extracts and validates user authorization attributes,
– obtains symmetric crypto key from KeyNegotiate ser-
vice.
The certiﬁcate included in the SOAP message belongs to
the requester and it is validated against public key of its
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Fig. 8. CWID test infrastructure.
reverse processing workﬂow takes place while sending each
of the SOAP response messages, e.g., to authenticate the
service to the requester. After the client has had an ac-
cess granted, the requested service communicates with au-
thority which was bilaterally exchanged at the memoran-
dum of cooperation (at the level of establishing trust).
User attributes are credentials describing the user place in
the organization hierarchy. Depending on the level of trust
between domains, this credentials may be used to take ap-
propriate authorization decision.
KeyNegotiate service is to exchange seeds that allows to
calculate symmetric crypto key. It could be derived from
shared secret values or from asymmetric computations.
This crypto key is used to encrypt communication between
the user and the requested service, which fulﬁls the conﬁ-
dentiality requirements.
If all of these processing stages return valid and correct val-
ues, PEP module, in turn, allows web service to proceed
further proprietary operations. The only stated require-
ment from the service provider is to call PEP operations
before processing any proper web service task, just after
receiving SOAP message request. The implementation was
based on open source web services frameworks and APIs,
e.g., JAX-WS Java API for web services, Bouncy Castle
Java Cryptography API and EJBCA – Open Source PKI
library.
PEP in order to have its response message appropriately
prepared. Just before sending web service response, PEP
is involved in preparation of the SAML assertion. It gains
user attributes and crypto key and prepares whole SOAP
message including SOAP header. This is implemented by
using output handler (JAX-WS handler), which delegates
the workﬂow to PEP. General logical workﬂow of pro-
cessing request and response SOAP messages is presented
in Fig. 7.
3.3. Verification of the Solution
General overview of tests carried out during workshops and
CWID 2009 exercises is depicted in Fig. 8. Tests and im-
plementations were prepared and developed by Polish and
Swedish teams engaged in realization of objective 4.2 ti-
tled Multinational Interagency Situational Awareness – Ex-
tended Maritime (MISA-EM), which is part of sixth edition
of MultiNational Experimentations (MNE-6).
It must be emphasized that the Swedish and Polish im-
plementation were prepared separately, without exchanging
any line of code. General concept of the cross-domain
security solution for both realizations based on the same
assumptions and was agreed before experiments. However,
the software products and solutions of security web ser-
vices are diﬀerent. The Swedish implementation does not
include PEP, however its functionalities were adopted to
security proxy service adding/removing security assertions
and secure token service (STS).
The tests covered a few scenarios. In the ﬁrst scenario
(see Fig. 9) the Swedish side invokes Polish blue force
tracking (BFT) service. At the client side, STS provided ex-
clusively by the Swedish side, was responsible for preparing
appropriate SAML assertions embedded in the SOAP mes-
sages. After receiving message by BFT service provider,
SAML assertion was analyzed by PEP, provided exclusively
by the Polish side. In case of any errors (i.e., wrong
or not valid X.509 certiﬁcates, not appropriate private keys,
modiﬁcations injected into SOAP messages), PEP informs
the BFT provider about such a situation and the processing
chain can be stopped (access denied). In case of success-
ful SAML assertion validation, BFT access was granted
and the service was called. Before sending BFT response
to the Swedish client, PEP was responsible for preparing
appropriate SAML assertion embedded in the SOAP re-
sponse message. After receiving BFT response, STS ana-
lyzed SAML assertion prepared at the Polish side. Similar
checking workﬂow was executed by STS module and in
case of any incompatibilities, BFT access was not granted
and the client was informed about that.
The second scenario was very similar to the mentioned
above. Security services were used in this case to pro-
vide cross-domain access control to the query by example
services (QbE) implemented at both sides. This scenario
tested bidirectional cooperation (SWE service – POL client,
POL service – SWE client).
In third scenario, QbE service was called indirect through
semantic search service. Details regarding the implementa-
tion and working of semantic search are out of scope of this
article but positive results of the tests prove proper work of
the security solutions.
It should be emphasized that all the tests were successful.
During the preparation phase for these experiments, the
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Fig. 9. Basic test scenario sequence diagram.
teams agreed on the solution and set the SAML assertion
speciﬁcation for the purpose of the trial. The implementa-
tions of PEP and STS security modules were independent,
without the necessity of sharing any piece of code.
4. Way Forward, Further Works
The solution presented in the article provides basic cross-
domain authentication allowing to make the authorization
decisions locally, in the domain of the service provider. It
relies on the trust between cooperating domains and sup-
ports the following security goals:
– authentication in the domain of the user which can
be veriﬁed in the domain of the service;
– local authorization in the domain of the service;
– integrity of the SOAP messages;
– non-repudiation of sending the message.
The work under cross-domain security is a broad subject
that should be deeply analyzed in multinational communi-
ties and experimented frequently in order to ﬁnd the most
suitable solution, acceptable for every nation, easy for im-
plementation and interoperable in heterogeneous environ-
ment. The work under these issues in MCI is being contin-
ued to provide coherent solution for cross-domain secure
information exchange in SOA-based dynamic environment.
Currently, we are at the stage of making arrangements for
tests of security solutions with the NC3A Core Services
Testbed, which will be carried out in 2010.
The ﬁrst step forward is to test the cross-domain authentica-
tion of users which utilize diﬀerent intradomain authentica-
tion methods, e.g., login/password, Kerberos and biometric
data. These authentication methods should be appropriately
identiﬁed by the authorization service and reﬂected in the
local security policy.
When dealing with the web services security, it needs to be
emphasised that the publish-subscribe mode of operation
should also be reﬂected. Since in this case the roles of
the service and the client are reversed (the client has the
service interface listening for notiﬁcations, the service has
the client side sending notiﬁcations) validity of the assertion
and the user certiﬁcate should be also checked during the
subscription period.
Another issue worth considering, and very much visible
in the web service environment is the concept and imple-
mentation of service chaining and single-sign-on mecha-
nisms. Service chaining is being used more and more of-
ten in service orchestration and is an intrinsic feature of
the SOA-based world. In order to guarantee appropriate
authentication, authorization, integrity and non-repudiation
of sending the message, there needs to be a mechanism
providing the identity delegation in the chain of services
allowing to recognize the initiator of the process and grant
the access to the service based on his credentials.
In the area of reliability of the information exchange the
need for combining the mechanism providing security and
quality of service must be emphasized. In this area the
work is conducted in scope of:
– joint security and QoS policy for application and net-
work layer resources access control,
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– dynamic policy modiﬁcation according to changing
conditions, e.g., risk evaluation, detected threats and
changing situation,
– access control rules (policy) negotiation between au-
tonomous systems using XACML before they start
information exchange.
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